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Abstract
Does.the.law.merely.contain.rules?.Or.does.it.also.include.morality?.The.debate.
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the.criteria. in. identifying.the.validity.sets.of. law.that.appropriate. in.the.legal.
system. (rule of recognition),. providing. authority. rules. for. the. legislature. to.
change. or. generate. new. law. (rule of change),. and. rule.which. authorizes. the.
court.to.decide.matters.of.law.and.procedure.to.follow.(rule of adjudication).4 
The.primary.rules.govern.behaviors.of.the.society,.while.secondary.rules.
centered.on.the.question.of.how.primary.rules.are.created,.developed,.deleted,.










secondary. rules. ignores. absolutely. moral. principles,. whereas. in. fact,. insists.
Dworkin,. moral. principles. have. its. fundamental. role. in. the. theory. of. law..
Secondly,.regarding.significant.concepts.in.Hart’s.legal.philosophy.as.the rule of 
recognition, Dworkin.believes.it.is.a.concept.which.is.inadequate.in.explaining.
the.validity.of.the.law.concepts.





II.  Hart and the Law as Rules 
It. seems. to. me. that. this. following. quotation. represents. all. Hart.







by. John.Austin. (1790-1859)..The.specificity.of. the. legal.philosophy.of.Austin.
centered.in.what.was.called.a.command.(command).imposed.sanctions.enforced.
by.the.sovereign.power..Hart.retorted.to.the.idea.of.Austin..According.to.Hart,.
the. law.as. a. command. fails.when. facing. latest. and. factual. cases..This. failure.




5.Unlike.Hart,. in.his.Law’s.Empire,.Ronald.Dworkin.see. to.believe. that. there. is.primacy.of. law,.
‘law beyond law’..Dworkin,.(1995). Law’s Empire..Massachusetts:.Harvard.University.Press,.pp..400-413..
Dworkin.also.believes.that.apart.from.‘sets of rules,’.law.consist.of.‘principles’..See,.Dworkin.(ed.),.(1977)..
The Philosophy of Law,.Oxford.:.Oxford.University.Press..pp..47-49.
6.Hart,.(1997)..ibid.,.p..98.











In.order. to. strengthen.his.understanding.of. the. rules,.Hart.began.with.
the. idea. about. social. rules.8 He.believed. that. there. are. at. least. two. concepts.
on.behavior.which.is.first,.behavior.that.is.governed.by.the.rules.of.behavior;.
and. secondly,. habitual-based.behavior..He. also.distinguished. legal. rules. from.
standards.and.rules.of. law. from.the.commandments. that.contain. threat..The.












consists.of. two. types.of. rules,.primary and secondary rules.. The. combination.
of.these.two.types.of.rules.is.Hart’s.fundamental.understanding.of.philosophy.
of. law..Law,. in.Hart’s.perspective. is.hereby.a.reciprocal. relationship.between.




although. the.primary. rules.play.a.main. role. in. the.establishment.of. coercive.
obligations,.it.could.not.construct.legal.system.as.well..The.creation.of.a.legal.
system. needs. mainly. reliable. categories. which. explicitly. admit. an. authority.
making.law.that.includes.construction.of.a.new.form.of.law.and.its.enforcement,.
particularly. in. terms.of. conflict. resolutions..These. rules. are. called. secondary 
rules of law.which.existence.is.recognized.to.the.extent.related.to.the.primary.
rules..As.a.result,.a.social.bonds.based.without.help.on.the.primary.rules.would.




authority.of.a. community..The rule of recognition. includes.authoritative. texts.
for. instance. laws.and. legislative.act; practices.that.have.become.habit,.public.
declarations.of.persons.or.court.decisions.in.the.past.in.cases.of.particular.or.
7.Hart,.(1997). The Concept of Law, op.cit.,.p..80.
8.Hart,.(1997)..The Concept of Law, ibid.,.pp..55-59.
9.Hart,.(1997)..The Concept of Law, ibid.,.p..82.













matters.beyond.the.rules. that.are.considered.as. legal..For.Hart,. the.principle.
which.says. that. there. is. still. law.beyond. the. law.basically. incredible.because.










Faced.with. certain. concrete. situations,.many. legal. standards. can. be. directly.













about. the.validity.of.a. fact. that. judges.sometimes.have. to.refer. to.something.
outside.the.rules.in.issuing.a.verdict?.Does.not.this.designate.that.rules.are.not.
10.Hart,.(1997)..The Concept of Law, op.cit.,.p..97..Open texture,.is.English.translation.of.a.German.word,.Porosität.which.means.permeate,.refers.
to. the. fact. that.subject.of. law. is. incapable.or.have.no.means. just. to. formulate. the. language.of. law.that.
finally.demand.a.subject.of.law.to.prepare.for.any.conceived.of.possibilities..In.his.Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy, Hart. reqouted. three.of.Wittgenstein’s.most. important. views. in.philosophy.of. language.
in. German:. (1). ‘Ich sagte von der Anwendung eines Wortes: sie sei nicht überall von Regeln begrenzt’:. I.
speak.about.the.use.of.a.word,.which.usage.however.is.limited.without.any.rules;.(2).‘Wirsind nict für alle 
Moghlichkeiten seiner Anwendung mit Regeln ausgerustet’:.We.are.fully.equipped.with.any.rules.for.all.the.
possibilities.of.such.usage.of.a.wod;.(3) ‘Der Umfang des Begiriffs ist durch eine Grenze nicht abgeschlossen: 
er ist nicht überall von Regeln begrenzt’:.The.range.of.a.concept.is.not.surrounded.by.a.boundary:.such.a.
kind.of.range.is.surrounded.by.no.rules..Hart,.Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, op.cit.,.p..274...English.
translation.my.own.
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at.all.clear.and.definite.or. imply.what.he.does.not. intend.to.preserve,. that. is.
skepticism. in. law?. All. these. questions. are,. as. identified. by. Ronald. Dworkin,.
breach.of.thought.that.pave.the.way.for.series.of.controversial.amongst.the.two.
outstanding.legal.philosophers..




legality. and.morality.. The. focus. itself. could.be. formulated. this.way:.whether.
the.law.simply.provides.social.rules.or.the.law.also.contains.moral.rules?.Is.the.
validity.of.the.law.determined.by.social.facts.or.moral.facts?12.
A.  Dworkin on the Law as Rule and Principle
Dworkin’s.opposition.against.Hart.was.broadly.summarized.in.two.main.
















2.. Discretion. thesis. comprehends. that. set. of. rules. that. are. legitimate. in.
accordance. to. its source,. is. entirely. of. the. law.. Beyond. such. by. decree.
decision,.neither.standards.nor.legal.principles.are.a.law..In.case.that.a.rule.
of.law.is.not.available.for.a.certain.case,.or.if.it.is.available.but.such.a.kind.






which. are:. first,. in. every. community. which. has. a. legal. system,. according. to.
12.See.the.complete.explanation.on.the.debate.in.Michael.D..Bayles,.(1992)..Hart’s Legal Philosophy,.
Dordrecht:.Kluwer.Academic.Publisher,.p..165;.bdk..Scott.J..Shapiro,.“The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short 














There. is.nothing.but.pedigree. thesis,. for.Dworkin,.which. is. intended.to.



























his. argument..A. judge,. according. to. him,. in. addressing. to. the. cases.which. is.
complicated,.could.never.be.allowed.to.decide.the.case.at.his.discretion.as.the.
consequence.that.he.is.bound.by.legal.principles..In.case.that.some.number.of.










14.Roland.Dworkin,.(1977)..Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit.,.p..40.




to. each. other.. Principles. have,. according. to. Dworkin,. a. “level. dimension”.15 













A. law.which. is.perceived. simply.of. rules. ignores. the.principles.. Yet,. to.
the.contrary,.on. the.practical. level.of. law,.principles.often.applied.vigorously..





Judges,. in. this. case,. according. to.Dworkin,. did. not. act. outside. the. law.
because.judges .are.bound.by.the.principles..Dworkin.argued,.if.principles.bind.
to.no.judges,.consequently.that.rules.would.bind.to.none.of.them..An.example.
of.binding.principles. is. the.principle.of. “legislative. supremacy”,. that. is. set. of.
principles.that.binds.the.judges.to.give.priority.over.the.rules.derived.from.the.






making.these.changes..In.the.case.of.Riggs against Palmer, it.is.the.principle.that.
no.one.is.allowed.to.take.into.account.the.benefit.of.his.or.her.crime.committed.
which.verifies.judges’.decision..
15.Roland.Dworkin,.(1977)..Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit.,.p..26.










Roland.Dworkin,.(1977)..Taking Rights Seriously, ibid,.p..23.
18.Roland.Dworkin,.(1977). Taking Rights Seriously, ibid.,..pp..37-8.
19.Roland.Dworkin,.(1977)..Taking Rights Seriously, ibid.,.p..38.
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Thesis.of.legal.obligations.(3).which.states.that.legal.obligations.derived.
from.the.rules.is.inadequate.because.it.would.turn.towards.the.ex post facto law.
or.retroactive..Consequently,.if.a.case.happens.before.the.promulgation.of.a.law,.
then.the.judge.must.create.new.law.through.discretion..Dworkin.believed.that.
this.explanation. is. inadequate.because. it.would. imply. that. judges.can. issued.
a.verdict.over.a.case.with.the.new.rule.was.made.after.a.case.occurs,.in.other.




B.  Soft Positivism: Hart’s Defensive Argument 
As. it. has. already. been. described. above,. Hart’s. legal. positivism. is.
summarized. by. his. opponent. in. debate. into. three. theses. that. is. pedigree,.
discretion,.and. the. thesis.of. legal.obligations..Pedigree. thesis. refers. to.Hart’s.
concept.of.rules.regarding.recognition.or.the rule of recognition,.that.the.legal.
validity.of.law.is.determined.by.social.facts,.support.by.the.power.enforcement.























testament.23   
Furthermore,. in. the.discretion.and. legal. liability. thesis,.Dworkin. tends.
to.indict.Hart.as.of.simply.admitted.rules.of.law,.while.excluding.the.standards,.
norms,. and. principles. in. the. system. of. his. legal. philosophy.. Identification. of.
law.merely.as.rules.directed.Hart.to.remove.discretion.thesis..If.a.rule.does.not.
20.Roland.Dworkin,.(1977)..Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit.,.p..44.
21.H.L.A.Hart,.(1983)..“Postscript”, in,.The Concept of Law, op.cit.,.p..241.
22.H.L.A.Hart,.(1983)..“Postscript” in, The Concept of Law, ibid.,.p..250.
23.See,.Michael.D..Bayles,.(1992)..Hart’s Legal Philosophy, op.cit.,.p..168.
















Hart.denied. that.he.has.developed.a. theory.of. law.based.solely.on. the.
rules,.and.ignores.the.principles..Though.in.the.Concept of Law he.paid.not.much.
attention. to. the. principles. but. that. does. not.mean.he. ignored. the. principles.
altogether.24 Besides,.Hart.also.did.not.consider.the. law.merely.as.a.rule. that.
is. standard. that. has. a. characteristic. “all-or-nothing”. which. could. not. be. in.
opposition.to.each.other.and.would.not.have.the.dimension.levels..Law.is,.for.

























24.Hart,.(1983).. “Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, op.cit.,.p..259-60.
25.Hart,.(1983)..“Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, ibid.,.p..252.
26.Hart,.(1983)..“Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, ibid.,.p..254.







called  plain-fact view,.is.identified.by.two.principles.that.is:.first,.the.legal.basis.
of.any.community. is.an.agreement.. If. the.officials.agreed.upon.the. fact. f.as.a.
fact.for.the.legal.basis.of.a.legal.system,.that.means.the.fact.f.is.a.legal.basis.of.
that.legal.system;.secondly,.Hart.argued.that.the.kind.of.facts.that.could.become.






at. the. legislation.27 These. two. principles,. according. to. Dworkin,. makes. Hart.
find.difficulties. to. sufficiently.explain. the.possibility.of.a. common theoretical 


















However,. Dworkin. persisted. that. in. such. an. unbreakable. case. judges.
do.not.have.a.consensus.on.determining.the.validity.of.the.law,.therefore,.they.


























Having. a. careful. look. at. this,. we. could. say. that. Hart’s. stance. remains.
inadequate..In.fact,.laws.are.always.connected.with.moral.issues..Law.does.not.
only.deal.with.the.number.of.rules.but.the.content.of.the.rule.itself..As.citizens.
we. can.not. receive. punishment.merely. because. of. the. rules. and. regulations,.




or.morality. compose. a. law. and. hence. there. is. nothing. else. outside. the. law..
We. should. not. confuse. positive. law. with. morality.. Assuming. the. absolute.
relationship.between.morality.and.law.is.not.necessarily.meant.that.both.are.
the.same.     
In. the.explanation.below. this.paper.would. try. to.elaborate. four.points.
wherein.both.morality.and.law.are.integrally.related.29:.
A. Law should have real concern on the objects of morality









be. followed.regardless.of.whether.or.not. the.norm. is. in.accordance.with. the.
interests.of.the.people.who.are.in.the.legal.system..Legal.order.thus.becomes.
categorical. reasons. for. action.. It. imposes. a.duty. that. citizens. should. comply..
Of.course,.though.the.law.has.absolute.imperative.but.it.does.not.make.all.its.
claims.morally.infallible..It.is.very.likely.that.legal.imperatives,.at.some.points,.
contradict.moral. values.. In. the. case. as. such,. there. is. no.moral. obligation. to.
28. "Law.according. to.Hart.must. include.at. least. three.moral. content,.namely,. the.prohibition.of.
violence,.theft.and.fraud"..Hart,.(1983)..The Concept of Law, op.cit.,.p..193.
29.See..L..Green,.“Positivism.and.the.Inseparability.of.Law.and.Moral”,.University of Oxford Faculty of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,.No..15/2008..Available.at.http://ssrn.com/abstrak=1136374




C. Law should promote justice (justice-apt)
A. legal. system,.which. is. formally.and.procedurally. fair. can.be.misused.













poetry,. for.example.. In.the.world.of.art. it. is.quite. irrelevant.to.ask.whether.a.
particular.music.or.poetry. is. fair.or.not..Criteria. for.good.music.or.poetry. is.
internal.. Good. music. is. music. that. has. harmonious,. unified,. and. interesting.
rhythm..We.do.not.demand.justice.from.music.




































less. important,. but. he. conceded. that. in. facing. unbreakable. cases. the. judges.
would.make.decision.that.was.preceded.by.a.careful.debate.about.the.principles.
which.are.appropriate.to.be.applied.upon.difficult.cases.at.hand.
From. this.description. it. can.be. concluded. that.both.Hart. and.Dworkin.
acknowledged.the.role.of.morality.in.the.law..Hart,.who.regarded.law.as.a.set.
of. rules,. did.not.mean. to. reject.morality..His. emphasis. on. the. importance.of.
rule. simply. reminds.us. that. the. law. in. the. first.place. is. a. rule,. and.as. a. rule.
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